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Abstract 
 
The world’s most influential development agency, the World Bank Group (WBG), is the leading 
actor in development finance and plays a central role in global efforts to protect the environment. 
Following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the institution was responsible for all investment projects 
of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which was then newly established to serve as the 
interim financial mechanism for the United Nations Conventions on Climate Change and 
Biodiversity.  The promise that the GEF would lead to the “greening” of development finance 
remains largely unfulfilled.    
 
More recently the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change appointed the WBG 
as the interim trustee of the new Green Climate Fund which plans to mobilize an estimated US$ 
100 billion per year by 2020.  
 
While the World Bank Group plays this critical role in global environmental efforts, its main 
business continues to be lending for development. This includes the financing of large-scale 
infrastructure projects, agribusiness, large dams as well as investments in gas, oil and mining.  
This regular lending portfolio for development is often at odds with environmental sustainability. 
For example, despite the growing area of climate finance, support for fossil fuel projects 
continues to be dominant in the institution’s lending for the energy sector.  Another climate-
related area is the World Bank’s pioneering role in advancing REDD+, an initiative designed to 
reduce the emission of global green house gases by integrating efforts to protect forest areas into 
global carbon markets. Ultimately, its success will depend on addressing sensitive questions such 
as land ownership, forest governance and the equitable sharing of benefits.  
 
In conclusion the paper considers the underlying corporate culture and the difficulties in 
reconciling environmental and social sustainability with the institution’s supply-side driven focus 
on meeting lending targets.  
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The Rio Earth Summit in 1992, also known the United Nations Conference on Development and 
Environment (UNCED), promised to inaugurate a new era where economic growth and 
environmental sustainability would be closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing.  The hope was 
that the 108 heads of state gathered in Rio would launch a new regime of international 
cooperation to transform our approach to development and protect the world’s climate and 
biodiversity.  
 
As the 20
th
 anniversary of UNCED approaches and delegates from all over the world will once 
again gather in Rio, it is critical to attempt a better understanding of what has been accomplished 
to date.  Here the focus is on the World Bank Group (WBG), the world’s most preeminent 
development institution with a membership of 187 countries and a large bureaucracy running its 
day-to-day business. The WBG has played a central role over the past two decades in financing 
efforts intended to promote sustainable development and address global environmental problems 
such as climate change and the loss of biodiversity. 
  
Following the publication of its seminal report on “Environment and Development” in the year 
of the Rio Conference
1
, the World Bank Group adopted a mission encapsulated in the twin goals 
of promoting poverty reduction and sustainable development.  The new mission statement 
was based on the recognition that fighting poverty is inescapably linked to environmental 
protection and improved management of natural resources. 
 
Considered to be a global knowledge center, World Bank Group thinking wields considerable 
influence over other public financial actors in the arena.  Institutions, such as the regional 
development banks and bilateral aid agencies tend to follow its lead. More recently, some of the 
world’s largest private sector banks, the so-called Equator Banks, have committed to adopting the 
environmental and social Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the World Bank Group’s branch that lends directly to the private sector.  
 
This paper reviews the WBG’s commitments to environmental policies and initiatives as the 
leading global actor in this arena.  It briefly considers the institution’s role at the center stage of 
financing for global environmental goals.  This is followed by considering the WBG’s  main 
business in development finance and a review of the WBG’s framework of environmental and 
social safeguards. The costs of exempting entire areas of lending from scrutiny of their 
environmental and social impacts are briefly sketched.  Given the WBG’s growing role in climate 
finance, the paper then considers lending for investment projects in the energy sector and 
reviews the opportunities and risks associated with WBG support for REDD+, an initiative 
designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by integrating the protection of tropical forests into 
global carbon markets. Finally, it will consider the underlying corporate culture and the difficulties 
in reconciling environmental and social sustainability with the institution’s supply-side driven focus 
on meeting lending targets. 
 
 
A Manager of Global Environmental Funds 
 
Prior to UNCED in 1992 and again now in the context of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the World Bank Group positioned itself as a key 
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institution in environmental finance.  It is central to both The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which were established two decades apart in the early 1990s 
and in 2010.  Both are mechanisms of financial transfers from North to South to meet the 
challenges of international environmental cooperation. 
 
Two decades ago, as preparations for the Rio Earth Summit were underway, most developed 
countries were eager to demonstrate their commitment to finance developing country efforts in 
addressing globally important environmental problems such as climate change and the loss of 
biodiversity.   Most developing countries, on the other hand, saw themselves confronted with too 
many other needs and did not consider global environmental problems as a major priority. They 
wanted, however, to make use of environmental preoccupations in countries of the North and the 
possibility of additional financial transfers to support their own domestic economic and 
environmental priorities (Fairman, 1996: 69).  
 
Perhaps even more importantly, Northern and Southern governments did not see eye-to-eye on 
the governance structure of a fund designed to address global environmental problems. 
Developing country would have preferred to create a new institution with equal voting rights for all 
state members.   
 
But developed countries in the early 1990s and again in the present decade insisted on using 
existing institutions to channel environmental finance.   Their clear preference was and continues 
to be the WBG where voting shares are proportional to a country’s financial contributions to the 
institution, which ensures the predominance of developed countries.  In anticipation of the Rio 
Summit, the World Bank’s Board of directors passed a resolution in 1991, which established the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and put the G 7 countries clearly in the driver’s seat in 
decisions on North-South financial transfers for the environment. 
 
But in view of developing countries misgivings about a structure in which most of them had a very 
limited voice, the GEF invited the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to join the GEF in a tripartite arrangement. It also 
innovated by creating a GEF Council in which the representation of developing countries was 
strengthened and decisions would require a ‘double majority’, that is a majority of both Northern 
donor and Southern recipient countries. In practice, however, twice yearly GEF Council meetings 
and their proceedings moved along by consensus.  The real power, at least in the GEF’s first 
decade, lay with the WBG. It was the trustee, provided the secretariat and was responsible for all 
of GEF investment projects making up the bulk of GEF funding, while the UNDP and UNEP were 
limited to carrying out technical assistance or environmental studies. The GEF bolstered the 
World Bank’s s credentials as an environmentally responsible institution and helped it establish 
leadership in an area of increasing interest to the public in its main donor countries (Fairman, 
1996: 72).  
 
For its entire first decade, the GEF had funding of about US$ 4 billion, a paltry sum when 
compared to the demands of developing countries or to the average annual lending of over US$ 
20 billion a year by the World Bank. To rationalize their limitations on funding, donors promoted 
the GEF as an environmental “Trojan Horse”, a means to integrate or “mainstream” 
environmental priorities into all activities of the WBG and its two junior partners. Mainstreaming 
was seen as a way to make the GEF’s small sums go further by “greening” development work 
more broadly.  
 
But mainstreaming did not take place (Fairman 1996:82).  With GEF funding , the World Bank 
has tackled the symptoms of selected environmental problems but GEF funds have not 
contributed to shaping lending in sectors such as energy, forestry and agribusiness that are 
central to climate and biodiversity protection (Young, 2002:215, Horta 1998:3). An official 
evaluation commissioned by the GEF in 1998 came to the same conclusion. Its one priority 
recommendation was the need to mainstream global environmental goals into the WBG’s  overall 
 4 
lending portfolio by, for example, shifting away from financing conventional power loans to a new 
role in financing sustainable energy technologies (Garrett et al., 1998: xv).  
 
Both the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on 
Biodiversity adopted the GEF as their interim financing mechanism in 1992.   But the GEF was 
never directly accountable to the Conventions and despite its early celebrations as being the one 
concrete outcome from the 1992 Rio conference, its importance has diminished over the past 
years. 
 
Similar to its initiative in establishing the GEF, the World Bank more recently positioned itself as a 
major financial actor in the area of climate change.  At stake are an estimated US$ 100 billion per 
year by 2020 from both public and private sources to assist developing countries in mitigating or 
adapting to climate change. In anticipation of substantial new money flows, the World Bank 
launched its Strategic Framework on Development and Climate Change in 2008. It was designed 
to  serve as a model for channeling  large-scale financing to developing countries to cover the 
added cost and risks to development posed by climate change. 
2
  Once again, the World Bank’s 
anticipation of donor sentiment seems to have paid off.  At the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
summit on climate change in Cancun in December 2011, the World Bank was appointed to serve 
as the interim trustee of a new Green Climate Fund (GCF).  The exact working modalities of the 
GCF and the role of the World Bank Group as interim trustee are still to be determined in on-
going international negotiations. 
 
Developed country governments continue to consider the World Bank Group to be the institution 
most suited to managing large scale funding flows with fiscal prudence. How exactly the World 
Bank as interim trustee of the GCF will transcend traditional donor-recipient relationships and 
become an instrument of the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
which recognizes the ecological debt of Northern countries to the South is still open to question.  
An additional open question is the impact of  China’s growing role on the WBG’s Board of 
Directors.  While the G 7’s role on this Board is still predominant, China has recently replaced 
Germany as the third largest shareholder of the institution after the United States and Japan. 
  
Given the post-financial crisis difficult economic situation in the traditional donor countries, the 
expectation is that public funding from donor governments for the GCF will leverage larger 
funding contributions from private sources.  The use of carbon markets, hedge funds and a 
variety of other more or less opaque financial instruments will be under consideration in order to 
meet the US$ 100 billion per year transfer target by 2020. 
 
While the World Bank’s exact role is still being debated and questions of whether GCF funds will 
be comingled with World Bank lending are yet to be answered, the World Bank will have an 
influential role both as the interim GCF trustee as well as through its leadership role in 
development finance.  The next sections of this paper will consider in more detail how the World 
Bank Group addresses environmental concerns in its  regular business as the world’s most 
influential lender for development. 
 
 
A Framework of Environmental & Social Safeguards 
 
“If the World Bank has been a problem in the past, it can and will be a strong force in finding 
solutions for the future,” 
3
 declared then World Bank president Barber B. Conable when he 
announced the establishment of a top-level Environment Department in 1987.  The promise of 
this new department was that environmental considerations would be integrated into all of the 
Bank’s lending and policy activities.  Largely spurred on by public criticism of major World Bank 
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programs, Polonoroeste in Brazil and Transmigration in Indonesia, both of which became 
emblematic for the destruction of tropical forests and the impoverishment of local populations, the 
Bank had recognized that it must adopt the environment as its own cause. 
  
At the core of the World Bank’s commitment are ten Environmental and Social Safeguards 
Policies as well as a new Access to Information Policy adopted in 2010, which is based on the 
presumption that most documents should be made publicly available to enhance transparency 
and ultimately positive development outcomes.
4
 
 
The Safeguard Policies cover a broad arrange of topics from environmental assessment and 
involuntary resettlement to indigenous peoples and forests.
5
 They were designed to avoid 
harming people and the environment in Bank supported projects, such as infrastructure 
development, power plants and large dams. They require consultations with project-affected 
people when assessing environmental impacts, the incorporation of their views in resettlement 
plans and the participation of indigenous peoples in the development of plans meant to benefit 
them. 
 
Unlike its Environmental Strategy, which is voluntary guidance for Bank staff, the Safeguards are 
mandatory.  This means that individuals or communities who feel that they are negatively affected 
by a Bank-financed project can submit complaints to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel and 
press for solutions to their problems whenever Safeguard Policies have not been properly 
adhered to. 
 
At present the World Bank has embarked on a process to update and consolidate its Safeguard 
Policy Framework because the current system is considered to be cumbersome and time-
consuming. This process is to be concluded by 2012.  While updating the policies is inherently a 
good idea, there is concern among civil society organizations that under the guise of  “unclogging 
the system,” there is the risk of undermining the existing regulatory framework instead of 
strengthening and broadening it. 
 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s important private sector branch, 
has a separate Sustainability Policy and Performance Standards for its private sector clients, 
which just underwent a major review.
6
 
 
Both the Safeguards and the Performance Standards only cover the shrinking area of traditional 
project finance. In the case of the IFC, for example, 47% of its current lending is now channeled 
through Financial Intermediaries, which are not subject to the same degree of environmental and 
social scrutiny.  In the case of World Bank public sector finance, an estimated 50% is now 
dedicated to providing lending for macro level policy reforms and direct budget support to 
developing country governments. Such lending is exempt from environmental and social impact 
considerations. 
 
 
The Cost of Exemptions 
 
The environment is more than a specific sector. It is cross-sectoral since activities at both the 
project level and at the macro-policy level have impacts on the environment and natural 
resources.  While the World Bank had promised to mainstream the environment by ensuring that 
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environmental concerns be incorporated into the entire portfolio of Bank activities,
7
 its 
Environmental and Social Safeguards have only been applicable to specific investment 
operations. 
 
Structural adjustment lending, which emerged forcefully in the 1980s when a combination of 
falling commodity prices and growing public sector deficits led to mounting debt service for many 
countries, is a case in point. The loans were made in exchange for a government’s adoption of a 
standard set of economic policy reforms, which included deregulation, privatization and trade 
liberalization and became known as the Washington Consensus.  All of these economic reform 
measures have environmental and social implications, which were not adequately assessed and 
taken into consideration.  
 
One example would be the shrinking of the role of the state in national economies promoted by 
structural adjustment lending. An unintended consequence was the reduction of national and 
local capacity to manage environmental problems such as addressing deforestation and water 
pollution. The potential impacts of this on local livelihoods and public health were not considered 
(Saprin 2004). 
 
A World Bank report in 2000 acknowledged that lending for growth-oriented macro-economic 
policy reforms had a highly negative impact on national capacity, “The adjustment decades also 
saw a substantial deterioration in the quality of public institutions, a demoralization of civil 
servants and a decline in the effectiveness of service delivery in many countries” (The World 
Bank 2000:37). 
 
The term structural adjustment was replaced in 2004 by the term development policy lending 
which augments the Washington Consensus to include institution-building, a focus on good 
governance and warnings about the corrosive forces of corruption.  
 
Has this contributed to greater attention to environmental sustainability? Not so, according to the 
World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).  In a seminal report published in 2008, it 
found that the Bank lacked a systematic environmental sustainability perspective across its policy 
and financial instruments.  It adds that the environment and natural resource management had 
not been given sufficient priority in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and other Bank analytical 
and/ or lending activities (Independent Evaluation Group 2008:5).  
 
The area of trade finance represents an illustrative example of the high environmental and social 
costs of exempting certain categories of loans from the Safeguards Framework.  For example, 
the WBG’s International Finance Corporation has provided trade finance to support corporations 
that export specific commodities such as palm oil, which is in high demand given the growing role 
of biofuels in the energy mix of many countries.  
 
The environmental and human rights impacts of this type of investment have become so 
problematic that World Bank president Zoellick established a moratorium on investments related 
to palm oil and other commodities grown in large-scale monocultural plantations in 2009.  This 
decision was the result of an audit undertaken by the International Finance Corporation’s 
Ombudsman’s office following civil society allegations of massive deforestation and human rights 
violations linked to IFC support for a trade facility for the Wilmar Group, one of the world’s largest 
plantation companies with vast holding in Indonesia and Malaysia. The audit confirmed serious 
IFC negligence and violations of environmental and social standards: “Because commercial 
pressures dominated IFC’s assessment process, the result was that environmental and social 
due diligence reviews did not occur as required.” 
8
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The moratorium was lifted in April 2011 with the publication of a new World Bank Group 
Framework and IFC Strategy to guide the institution’s future engagement with the global palm oil 
sector.  It promises to support small holders, share benefits with local communities and protect 
forests and biodiversity. 
9
 With the expansion of large-scale agribusiness operations in many of 
the WBG’s client countries, these commitments are important.  However, what counts is their 
implementation in practice and this remains to be tested. 
 
 
Difficulties in Implementation: Investment Projects 
 
World Bank Safeguard Policies and IFC Performance Standards do apply to traditional project 
finance, such as investments in infra-structure development and in oil, gas and mining.  In the 
following we briefly consider investments in the energy sector and support for REDD+ both of 
which are particularly sensitive to climate change considerations 
 
 
Energy Lending  
 
The World Bank’s most recent Annual Reports have highlighted the links between climate change 
and poverty. Its 2009 report stated that “Climate Change will most severely affect the poorest 
peoples and the poorest countries, potentially reversing decades of development 
achievements...“
10
 Its 2010 Annual Report again emphasizes that climate changes puts the gains 
in the fight against poverty and the lives and livelihoods of billions of people at risk.   
 
Today addressing climate change has become one of the World Bank Group’s banner activities 
(The World Bank 2008).  Donor governments promoted this development by committing an 
additional US$ 6.1 billion for World Bank-managed Climate Investment Funds in 2008.
11
 
 
This welcome shift to a focus on climate change would have provided a unique opportunity to 
overhaul the World Bank Group’s portfolio to ensure that all its lending and non-lending activities 
are consistent with climate protection goals.  However, while the institution’s new Energy 
Strategy, which is currently being prepared, contemplates increasing support for energy access 
for poor people and low-carbon development, the World Bank continues to be a major funder of 
fossil fuel projects.  Lending for coal projects, the most heavily polluting of fossil fuels, has 
reached record levels in recent years.
12
  One of the most controversial recent World Bank 
investments is the Medupi coal-fired power plant in South Africa, the World Bank’s single largest 
operation in Africa in 2010. 
 
The Medupi power plant is financed through a World Bank loan of  US$ 3.75 billion loan for 
Eskom Holding, Ltd., South Africa´s state-owned utility (The World Bank 2010:20). It finances the 
4,800 MW coal-fired power plant, one of the largest in the world.   It also includes US$ 200 million 
for renewable energy, a small fraction of the massive investment. 
 
The Medupi plant will use super-critical coal, which burns coal more efficiently than standard coal-
fired power plants. But this does not make it a “low carbon option” and it will lock South Africa into 
burning coal for decades to come. The Bank itself estimates that at full output Medupi will release 
30 million tons of CO
2 
per year, although it claims that the net increase in CO
2
 emissions will be 
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considerably lower because the project will provide energy access to the poor and replace diesel 
generators, candles and kerosene. 
13
 
 
But South African NGOs and the affected people remain unconvinced. They have filed a claim 
with the World Bank’s Inspection Panel stating that the project will cause massive pollution and 
significantly damage their health, livelihoods and the environment.
14
  In addition, they consider 
the project to be a subsidy to large corporations that will do little to provide energy to local 
populations.  According to Bobby Peek, Director of the NGO GroundWork in South Africa, “This 
project is to secure uninterrupted electricity for large corporations, such as smelters and mining 
houses under secretive special pricing agreements. It is not for the millions of poor people who 
cannot afford or do not have access to electricity. South Africa does not need this loan.”
15
 
 
The World Bank’s Inspection Panel undertook an initial field visit and found sufficient evidence to 
justify a full-scale investigation of possible violations of Environmental and Social Safeguards. 
16
   
The investigation is to be concluded in late 2011. 
 
World Bank Group investments in oil, gas and mining have been controversial for many years 
because of their association with environmental degradation, human rights violations and 
corruption.  In order to address some of these problems, the World Bank commissioned the 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR) headed by Emil Salim, a former Indonesian environment 
minister, in 2000. The EIR’s mission was to provide a set of recommendations to guide World 
Bank Group investments in the extractive sector with the goal of ensuring their compatibility with 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development.  The EIR report, published in 2003, 
recommended an immediate halt to all investments in coal and a gradual phasing out of 
investments in fossil fuels more broadly. In addition, it called for improved dialogue, respect for 
human rights, participatory decision-making and sound environmental practices in extractive 
projects  (EIR 2003).   But  to date fossil fuel lending, including coal, continue to play a dominant 
role in the WBG’s energy portfolio and the EIR’s recommendations remain to be implemented. 
 
On a broader scale, the WBG’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) examined the environmental 
sustainability of a WBG investment portfolio of US$ 400 billion covering the years 1990-2007.  
The evaluation concluded that while attention to the environment had grown over those years, the 
WBG had not put environmental sustainability considerations into practice when it was lending for 
large dams, agribusiness, pipelines and other projects (Independent Evaluation Group 2008).  
 
 
Climate Change & Forests: Opportunities & Risks of REDD+  
 
The destruction of tropical forests represents approximately 17% of greenhouse gas emissions 
generated by human activity. The initial idea behind REDD (Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 
was that compensating developing countries for slowing their rates of deforestation represented 
cost-effective and near-term opportunities to stabilize the world’s climate. In addition, it would 
generate other benefits as well, such as the protection of biodiversity and the generation of 
income for economic development. 
17
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Compensating countries for reducing their rates of deforestation from a given baseline (the 
deforestation that would have happened anyway) ran the risk of providing perverse incentives.  
Some governments might have decided to accelerate rates of deforestation in their countries in 
order to qualify for higher compensation payments.  To address this problem, REDD has now 
been expanded to REDD+ which also considers compensation for activities that contribute to 
forest conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of carbon stocks.  
 
REDD+ presents both opportunities and risks.  The opportunities are the opening up of political 
space to address questions of governance, corruption and land rights as well as finding solutions 
to the underlying causes of deforestation. On the risk side are issues of land speculation, eviction 
of forest-dependent people, loss of traditional knowledge systems and outright fraud and 
corruption as vested interests seek to profit from lucrative carbon deals. Furthermore, there is the 
risk that endemic rent seeking in countries with poor governance systems will lead to REDD+ 
carbon credits that do not represent genuine reductions in CO
2 
emissions (Lohmann 2009).  
 
The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is the most prominent of REDD+ 
related initiatives.  It came into effect in June 2008 and consists of two parts: a REDD-Readiness 
Mechanism to prepare countries for REDD, and a Carbon Fund to broker carbon finance 
transactions.
18
  The Carbon Fund, which is scheduled to become fully operational in 2011, will 
enable countries to participate in global carbon markets.   The goal is for countries to sell their 
Emissions Reductions (ERs) to buyers who find it more cost-effective to purchase ERs than to 
meet their own emissions reduction targets through technological or other means. 
 
The FCPF has established several criteria that should be included in REDD+ Readiness 
preparations, including consultations with civil society and indigenous peoples. According to the 
FCPF Charter, World Bank Environmental and Social Safeguard apply to REDD+ initiatives, 
although there is ambiguity about whether the Safeguards are already applied at the planning 
stages or only later during implementation (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 2011) .  
 
The Congo Basin Forest is the second largest after the Amazon and represents one of the 
regions where the FCPF is pioneering REDD+.  One of its client countries is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, (DRC) which covers more than half of the Congo Basin forest. DRC provides 
a critical example of how difficult preparations for REDD+ are in practice.  Institutions are weak 
and not present in large swaths of the country.  Questions of land-ownership, resource-use rights 
and rights to sharing in the benefits of REDD+ payments all remain to be worked out (Horta 
2009).  
 
DRC’s  has a very poor record in using the income from its vast wealth in minerals and other 
natural resources for poverty reduction purposes.  Civil society organizations in the region are 
concerned that shifting cultivation is considered to be a primary driver of deforestation, while 
industrial-scale logging and mining operations are left out of the equation.  The stage may be set 
for blaming the poor for deforestation while REDD+ benefits accrue to powerful interests. 
 
In DRC as elsewhere, it will be an enormous challenge to ensure that income generated by 
REDD+ will be shared with the populations living in the forested areas (Sunderlin et al 2008). 
 
The World Bank’s own record in DRC’s forest sector is not encouraging.  In 2007 its Inspection 
Panel investigated World Bank forest-related investments in DRC. Its investigation report 
concluded that Bank activities had focused on industrial timber production and had largely 
ignored environmental and socio-economic issues, including the needs of the approximately 40 
million people in DRC who rely on forest resources for their subsistence (The Inspection Panel 
2007). 
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A central problem for the World Bank’s FCPF is that its accelerated schedule to assist countries 
in getting ready for REDD+ and participating in carbon markets is not easily reconcilable with the 
need for broad participation and the strengthening of national institutions, which require longer-
term timeframes. 
 
 
A Corporate Culture at Odds with Sustainability 
 
As this paper has tried to demonstrate, the WBG’s  environmental agenda continues to be 
unfinished. The lack of policy coherence is illustrated by the WBG’s growing role in climate 
finance and its simultaneous financing of large-scale fossil fuel development, which locks 
developing countries into high greenhouse gas emissions for decades to come. 
 
The World Bank Group’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) has documented a static and 
problematic investment program in the energy sector where incentives are stacked against much 
needed lending for energy efficiency and renewable energy (IEG 2008:ix).   The IEG also has 
called for much more rigorous environmental and economic assessments of energy investments 
as well as for the reshaping of the WBG’s internal incentive system.  
 
Over the past two decades IEG evaluation reports as well as the findings and recommendations 
of both internal and external Panels and Commissions, have provided valuable contributions  with 
the goal of improving the environmental sustainability of WBG operations.  But the WBG has 
mainly stuck to a course that has long been subject to serious criticism (IEG 2008:xxv).  
 
What explains the lack of coherence between official discourse on the environment and actual 
financing decisions?  
 
The central problem was already identified in 1992 by Willi Wapenhans, a former World Bank 
Vice-President. He referred to the institutional “culture of  (loan) approval” as a critical obstacle to 
improving loan quality (Wapenhans 1992). Internal staff incentives are based on moving money 
and not on actual results in terms of reducing poverty or promoting sustainable development.  
The lack of attention to actual results has been documented in numerous internal evaluation 
reports, which have consistently pointed to serious shortcomings in monitoring and supervision of 
WBG-supported operations  (OED 2000, OED 2002, IEG 2008).  But evaluation findings have not 
led to significant changes.   
 
Former World Bank official Steve Berkman describes the situation in vivid language:  “Obsessed 
with moving money to further our own careers, we had somehow forgotten our fiduciary 
responsibilities and just plain old-fashioned logic as we approved loan after loan, enriching the 
corrupt while ensuring that the poor would remain in poverty.” (Berkman 2010: 159). 
 
The present geopolitical shifts at the global level with the growing power of China, India, Brazil 
and other developing country powers are also leading to increasing strength of these countries on 
the Board of Executive Directors at the World Bank.  The growing importance of emerging powers 
has already led to new trends such as the use of country-systems , i.e. the replacement of World 
Bank Safeguards with environmental and social regulations in the borrowing countries. This could 
be positive as long as public accountability is built into this system.   However, if the country-
systems approach impedes the independent monitoring of environmental and social impacts, 
then it will serve primarily to move large amounts of money with little accountability. 
 
Sustainable development will remain largely elusive as long as the political and economic forces 
driving unsustainable practices are not addressed.  Whether developed country governments or 
the new powers on the global stage with an important voice at the World Bank will develop the 
political will to address the root causes of the environmental problems engulfing our planet is an 
open question.  
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